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I.

INTRODUCTION

“The right to swing my fist ends where the other man’s nose
begins” is an axiom not always, but often attributed to Oliver Wendell
Holmes. 1 Whichever learned individual penned it, the quotation
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exemplifies the omnipresent and judicially confounding tension between
“freedom of” and “freedom from” speech and expression.
In reviewing In re Welfare of A.J.B., the Minnesota Supreme
Court invalidated Minnesota’s stalking-by-mail statute and narrowed the
mail-harassment statute. 2 Under the first statute, stalking-by-mail occurs
when a person “repeatedly mails or delivers or causes the delivery by any
means, including electronically, of letters, telegrams, messages, packages” 3
and “the actor knows or has reason to know [this conduct] would cause the
victim under the circumstances to feel frightened, threatened, oppressed,
persecuted, or intimidated.” 4 Pursuant to the second statute, mail
harassment occurs when an actor “with the intent to abuse, disturb, or cause
distress, repeatedly mails or delivers or causes the delivery by any means,
including electronically, of letters, telegrams, or packages.” 5
The court determined both statutes were sufficiently overbroad
and violated the First Amendment. 6 While the court invalidated the first
statute in its entirety, it saved the second statute by severing the overbroad
language. 7 In doing so, the court balanced the importance of maintaining
the protections offered by the statute with the constitutional right to free
speech.
This Paper examines the court’s decision and whether it could
have (and should have) gone further to protect Minnesotans’ safety while
maintaining their First Amendment protections. The Paper begins with a
history of significant cases and government action involving the First
Amendment that both broadened and narrowed protected speech and
expressive conduct. 8 This Part also explores some of the limited exceptions
to First Amendment protections. 9 The Paper then discusses the facts and
procedural posture of In re Welfare of A.J.B. 10 Next, it explores the
overbreadth doctrine in relation to A.J.B., how speech can be considered
conduct, and whether hate speech should maintain constitutional
protection. 11 Then, the Paper looks at the First Amendment in a modern
context, specifically how private actors intervene to fill the gaps left by the
Bob Hooper, Freedom, Responsibility, and Accountability, THE HAYS DAILY NEWS (July
14,
2016),
https://www.hdnews.net/474620df-b1ff-5873-a1ef-54229ac61a4f.html
[https://perma.cc/9XST-YKX6].
In re Welfare of A.J.B., 929 N.W.2d 840, 864 (Minn. 2019).
MINN. STAT. § 609.749, subdiv. 2(6) (2018).
Id. § subdiv. 1.
Id. § subdiv. 1(3).
A.J.B., 929 N.W.2d at 864.

1

2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9

10
11

Id.
See infra Part II.
See infra Part II.
See infra Part III.
See infra Part IV.
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government. 12 Finally, it concludes that, while the court was correct in its
ruling on the legal merits of the challenge, it missed an opportunity to create
additional societal protections by narrowing protected speech, ultimately
weakening its reasoning. 13
I.

HISTORY OF FREE SPEECH

The United States Constitution guarantees that “Congress shall
make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech . . . .” 14 This guarantee is
a bedrock principle of American democracy. 15 In the many years since the
ratification of the First Amendment, the limits and reach of this freedom
have been tested. 16 Protected speech was both restricted and expanded. 17
The overbreadth doctrine is a common mechanism by which to
challenge First Amendment protections. 18 The doctrine holds that “a law
may be invalidated as overbroad if ‘a substantial number of its applications
are unconstitutional, judged in relation to the statute’s plainly legitimate
sweep.’” 19 Decisions in favor of free speech are predicated on this doctrine,
which is based on the sensitive nature of protected expression. 20 The
Supreme Court’s opinion in Gooding v. Wilson refers to the “transcendent
value to all society of constitutionally protected expression . . . .” 21 One has

12
13

See infra Part V.
See infra Part VI.

U.S. CONST. amend. I.
Steven J. Wermiel, The Ongoing Challenge to Define Free Speech, 43 HUMAN RIGHTS,
no. 4, 2018, at C2. (“Freedom of speech, Supreme Court Justice Benjamin Cardozo declared
more than 80 years ago, ‘is the matrix, the indispensable condition of nearly every other form
of freedom.’”).
See, e.g., id. (“227 years after the first 10 amendments to the U.S. Constitution were ratified
in 1791 . . . debate continues about the meaning of freedom of speech . . . .”).
Marc O. DeGirolami, The Sickness unto Death of the First Amendment, 42 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL’Y 751, 752 (2019).
See Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 119 (1990); see also Overbreadth Doctrine, LAW
LIBRARY
–
AMERICAN
LAW
AND
LEGAL
INFORMATION,
https://law.jrank.org/pages/8973/Overbreadth-Doctrine.html
[https://perma.cc/JGL6CQS5] (“One common argument in First Amendment challenges is that the statute is
overbroad.”).
See United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 473 (2010) (quoting Washington State Grange
v. Washington State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442, 449 (2008)).
Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 521 (1972) (“[P]ersons whose expression is
constitutionally protected may well refrain from exercising their rights for fear of criminal
sanctions provided by a statute susceptible of application to protected expression.”).
14
15

16

17

18

19

20

21

Id.
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only to probe the authoritarian regimes of North Korea 22 or Libya 23 to
observe governments significantly curbing free speech and expression to the
detriment of their people. 24
At the same time, courts have contrarily favored citizen
protections over free speech. 25 Striking down a law that honors First
Amendment protections as overbroad has been viewed as having limited
potency. 26 For example, the effect of a federal overbreadth judgment is
binding solely over the parties to the lawsuit. 27 Civil actions can still proceed,
and the state may pursue criminal prosecutions against nonparties. 28 Even at
the United States Supreme Court level, a law cannot be stricken from a
state’s statute books, nor can a state be barred from narrowing an
“invalidated” statute to bring it into constitutional compliance. 29 More
importantly, these overbreadth opinions reason that a state has the right to
enact and enforce “valid criminal laws that reflect legitimate state interests
in maintaining comprehensive controls over harmful, constitutionally
unprotected conduct,” including speech that results in conduct. 30 While
such laws may have a chilling effect on speech if they are especially
overbroad, the negative effects of harmful speech, the reasoning goes,

Morse H. Tan, A State of Rightlessness: The Egregious Case of North Korea, 80 MISS.
L.J. 681, 681 (2010) (discussing North Korea’s “astonishing absence of a free press, free
speech, and free association rights . . . .”).
Mustafa Fetouri, Freedom of Speech Yet Another Casualty of the Libyan Uprising, THE
NAT’L NEWS (June 28, 2017), https://www.thenationalnews.com/opinion/freedom-ofspeech-yet-another-casualty-of-the-libyan-uprising-1.92357 [https://perma.cc/R7J7-FU5V].
Libya exemplifies the fragility of these freedoms. After the Arab Spring uprising in 2011,
previously unavailable free expression flourished, but given the country’s continued political
instability, once again those rights have precipitously deteriorated. Id.
10 Most Censored Countries, COMM. TO PROTECT JOURNALISTS (Sept. 10, 2019),
https://cpj.org/reports/2019/09/10-most-censored-eritrea-north-korea-turkmenistanjournalist/ [https://perma.cc/RCM7-S4GL] (detailing the digital censorship, surveillance, and
traditional methods used to silence media in the top ten most repressive countries).
See, e.g., New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 764 (1982) (“When [material involving child
pornography] bears so heavily and pervasively on the welfare of children engaged in its
production, we think the balance of competing interests is clearly struck and that it is
permissible to consider these materials as without the protection of the First Amendment.”);
accord Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 522 (1972).
Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Making Sense of Overbreadth, 100 YALE L.J. 853, 853 (1991)
(“Characterized by both the Supreme Court and scholarly commentators as ‘strong
medicine’ that courts ought to administer cautiously, overbreadth doctrine is frequently a far
weaker potion than either its champions or its critics have appreciated.” (internal citation
omitted)).
22

23

24

25

26

27
28
29
30

Id.
Id.
Id. at 853–54.

Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 615 (1973).
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should allow a state to exercise its authority to enforce a constitutionally valid
statute without court intervention. 31

A.

Free Speech Origins

In the early American Republic, the Founders believed “natural
rights” (things citizens could do without a government) included speaking,
writing, and publishing. 32 In 1789, James Madison referred to freedom of
speech as a natural right when he proposed constitutional amendments. 33
Perhaps, as a result, the First Amendment cemented the natural right to
freely express one’s thoughts; however, that right was subject to restrictions
for the common good. 34 Eighteenth-century Americans believed free speech
was a right, but also believed the government had a right to “constrain
[speech] in order to achieve or protect certain collective social goods . . .
assum[ing] that the political community could and should make value
judgments among different ideas.” 35 This idea—that the protection of natural
rights must be balanced with the enforcement of legal rules—is central to the
Founders’ belief that the freedoms enshrined in the Constitution are not
always legally supreme. 36 The concept of a “public good” (also described as
“general welfare” or “public interest”) is the basis for this Paper’s push-back
on the minimal exceptions to the protection of speech. 37

B.

Fluctuating Freedom

It is little wonder why balancing is such an important tool of First
Amendment jurisprudence. Even amongst themselves, legislators, courts,
and advocacy groups utilize inconsistent approaches to First Amendment
speech protections, both abruptly and systemically reversing course on
policy and personal ideology over time.

1.

Legislative and Executive Indecision

Those who made and enforced the laws during the eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries happily dipped their toes in First Amendment waters,
running back to shore when it was too cold. The 1798 Sedition Act
Id. (“[W]e believe that the overbreadth of a statute must not only be real, but substantial as
well, judged in relation to the statute’s plainly legitimate sweep.”).
Jud Campbell, Natural Rights and the First Amendment, 127 YALE L.J. 246, 265–66
(2017).
Id. at 264.
Id. at 304–07.
DeGirolami, supra note 17, at 752.
Campbell, supra note 32, at 252–54.
Id. at 253 (defining a public good to be “generally understood as the welfare of the entire
society.”).
31

32

33
34
35
36
37
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criminalized “false and malicious criticism of the Federalist Party—that is,
the president or Congress.” 38 By 1802, all Alien and Sedition Acts had
expired or been repealed. 39 In 1836, the U.S. House of Representatives
adopted gag rules preventing the discussion of anti-slavery proposals. 40 Due
to opposition on free speech grounds, the House repealed the rules in
1844. 41 Sedition Acts in both the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries fared
similarly. In 1798, John Adams, upset by his critics, pushed for and passed
a Sedition Act, which restricted criticism against the President. 42 When
Thomas Jefferson assumed the presidency just two years later, the law
expired and was not renewed. 43 Similarly, Congress passed the Sedition Act
of 1918 to prohibit citizens from speaking out against the government or the
war, but Congress then repealed the Act in 1921. 44
The next hundred years of American governance proved equally
vulnerable to the legislative and judicial dance, wherein Congress passed
politically driven legislation, and the judiciary subsequently imposed
constitutional limits. The Alien Registration Act of 1940 (also known as the
Smith Act, after Representative Howard Smith, the Act’s sponsor) made it
a crime to advocate for the violent overthrow of the government and
required official government registration of all adult non-citizens. 45 While
the Act was never officially repealed, in 1957, the Supreme Court
overturned fourteen convictions under the Smith Act, 46 citing a violation of
the First Amendment, which limited it to such a degree that, after Yates, no
future Smith Act violations were prosecuted. 47
In 1996, there was no clear consensus among the branches of
government when Congress passed the Communications Decency Act
(CDA), 48 which was immediately challenged on First Amendment grounds
Joseph Russomanno, The Right and the Duty: Jefferson, Sedition and the Birth of the First
Amendment’s Central Meaning, 23 COMM. L. & POL’Y 49, 51 (2017).
38

Sedition Act of 1798, ch. 74, 1 Stat. 596 (1798) (expired 1801); Alien Act of 1798, ch. 58,
1 Stat. 570, 570–71 (1798) (expired 1801).
Lynn D. Wardle, The Quandary of Pro-Life Free Speech: A Lesson from the Abolitionists,
62 ALB. L. REV. 853, 930 (1999) (“The abolitionists’ campaign of petitions to abolish slavery
in the District of Columbia and to prohibit interstate slave trade also provoked efforts to
suppress anti-slavery free speech.”).
Id. at 933.
Russomanno, supra note 38, at 64–65, 75.
Id. at 77.
U.S. Congress Passes Sedition Act, HISTORY.COM, https://www.history.com/this-day-inhistory/u-s-congress-passes-sedition-act [https://perma.cc/P34C-SZQE].
Alien Registration Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2835 (1940).
Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 301, 338 (1957).
Yates v. United States, BRITANNICA.COM, https://www.britannica.com/topic/Yates-vUnited-States [https://perma.cc/6WWG-4QPS].
William A. Sodeman, Communications Decency Act, BRITANNICA.COM,
https://www.britannica.com/topic/Communications-Decency-Act [https://perma.cc/NW5D39

40

41
42
43
44

45
46
47

48
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and struck down by the Supreme Court a mere twelve months later. 49 The
Court concluded that the CDA was too vague and trampled on protected
speech. 50

2.

Judicial Vacillation

The Supreme Court, as a body, similarly does not have a unified
historical posture on the extent to which speech should be protected. 51
The Supreme Court of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries
sanctioned free speech with great latitude in the decisions of the few related
cases it heard. 52 It is no surprise that early American courts aimed to testdrive the First Amendment to see how she handled on the open road. After
decades of monarchical rule, a successful revolution, and the arduous
construction of a new form of government and Constitution, it makes
perfect sense that the nineteenth century opened a large umbrella of free
speech protection. 53
During the first half of the twentieth century, the Supreme Court
began paying closer attention to free speech issues, causing judicial whiplash
as it ruled and then overruled itself. 54 At a time marked by war and its
aftermath, and filled with suspicion and paranoia, it is understandable that
the Court preferred a narrow view of what speech can be protected.
In 1919, the Court weighed in with a trio of cases affirming the
curtailment of free speech during wartime to protect the general welfare. 55
P4EJ] (“The CDA created a criminal cause of action against those who knowingly transmit
‘obscene’ or ‘indecent’ messages, as determined by local community standards, to a recipient
under the age of 18 years.”).
Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 885 (1997).
Id. at 874.
Luke Meier, A Broad Attack on Overbreadth, 40 VAL. U. L. REV. 113, 117 (2005)
(“Unfortunately, it is impossible to identify a unified theory for how courts decide free speech
cases.”).
Genevieve Lakier, The Invention of Low-Value Speech, 128 HARV. L. REV. 2166, 2179
(2015) (noting that the Court, in that period, ruled broadly in favor of free speech protections,
concluding only once that a particular kind of expression did not fall under the umbrella of
First Amendment protection. See State v. Blair, 60 N.W. 486, 487 (1894) (holding that a law
prohibiting “itinerant vender[s]” from publicly advertising their ability to treat diseases did
not violate the state constitutional guarantees of speech and press freedom).
See, e.g., Dailey v. Superior Ct. of S. F., 44 P. 458, 459 (1896) (“The production of a
tragedy or comedy upon the theatrical stage is a publication to the world by word of mouth
of the text of the author” and is therefore protected by the free speech and press provision
of the California Constitution).
See infra Part II.B.
See Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 53 (1919) (holding that the Espionage Act was
not a violation of the First Amendment); accord Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211, 216–
17 (1919) (holding that Mr. Debs’s First Amendment rights were not violated when he was
convicted under the Espionage Act); accord Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 624
(1919) (holding that the Espionage Act is constitutional).
49
50
51

52

53

54
55
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Enshrining into our lexicon the enduring (if simplistic) axiom about yelling
fire in a crowded theater, Oliver Wendell Holmes created a conditional
standard for protected speech: what can be said in times of peace may not
be legal during times of war. This conditional standard has become known
as the “clear and present danger” test. 56 A “clear and present danger” is one
that “will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to
prevent.” 57
Further prioritizing the protection of the public interest from the
harmful consequences of speech, in 1942, the Court found that the First
Amendment did not protect “fighting words.” 58 Similarly, in West Virginia
State Board of Education v. Barnette, the West Virginia School Board’s
policy requiring the recitation of the Pledge of Allegiance was found
unconstitutional. 59 The Court further narrowed free speech by adding
another unprotected category: obscenity. 60 Hearkening back to the 1919
cases 61 and embodying the chill on free speech wrought by McCarthyism,
the Supreme Court upheld the conviction of citizens who spoke about
overthrowing the government. 62 Due to the political climate, the first fifty
years of the twentieth century saw First Amendment rights take a back seat
to protections of “the public good.” 63
Conversely, the latter half of the twentieth century saw the
Supreme Court reverse course and put its weight behind the protection of
free speech and expression, reflecting decades of progressive social and
political upheaval. Fifty years after Justice Holmes penned the “clear and
present danger” test in Schenck, Brandenburg v. Ohio completed the test’s
evolution for First Amendment speech protections. 64 The Brandenburg test
56
57
58

Schenck, 249 U.S. at 52.
Id.
See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942) (defining “fighting words” as

those which “by their very utterance, inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of
the peace” and “such utterances [that] are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and
are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from
them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality.”).
West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) (holding that the
First Amendment cannot enforce consensus of opinion on an issue or idea).
See generally Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957); see also Miller v. California,
413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973) (creating a three-pronged test to determine whether and which speech
is obscene); FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748–51 (1978) (clarifying the difference
between “indecent” and “obscene” and granting the FCC the power to fine networks for
broadcasting indecent content).
See Schenck, 249 U.S. at 53; Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919); Abrams v. United
States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919).
See Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 590–91 (1951) (Douglass, J., dissenting).
See Campbell, supra note 32, at 253 (defining “public good”).
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 449 (1969); Remarks of William Van Alstyne on the
Brandenburg Panel, 44 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 85, 86 (2011) (“The Brandenburg test thus
59

60

61

62
63
64
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dictates that speech can be punished only “where such advocacy is directed
to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or
produce such action.” 65 Holmes’s Schenck opinion was so emphatically
overruled that Justice Black filed a brief concurrence in Brandenburg,
stating that “the ‘clear and present danger’ doctrine should have no place in
the interpretation of the First Amendment.” 66 Affirming that even hate
speech is protected under the Constitution as long as it does not incite
violence, Brandenburg was a landmark decision in the expansion of the First
Amendment shield. 67
Cases that reflected the shift in the Court’s increasingly
protectionist attitude toward First Amendment speech continued to mount.
In a major win for student activists in 1969, the Court held it
unconstitutional for school officials to censor student expression (in this
case, black armbands to protest U.S. involvement in Vietnam). 68 The Court
theorized that prohibiting only specific political symbols (anti-Vietnam
armbands) effectively prohibits the expression of one particular opinion and
is unconstitutional. 69 In Cohen v. California, the Supreme Court reversed
the conviction of a man charged with disturbing the peace by wearing a
jacket containing a visible expletive. 70 The Court wrote, “[O]ne can[not]
forbid particular words without also running a substantial risk of suppressing
ideas in the process.” 71 Another school-related case, Board of Education v.
Pico, held that books could not be banned from school libraries based on
the books’ content or message. 72 Flag burning was also decriminalized in
Texas v. Johnson when the Court ruled the activity constituted political
protest and was, therefore, a form of symbolic speech that is protected by
the First Amendment. 73
Analysis of the Court’s shift in attitude toward the First
Amendment over the twentieth century cannot be done without recognizing
the historical context in which it occurred. Similar to the Framers’
reactionary interest in opening a wide umbrella of free speech protections
after years of monarchical rule, the post-1950s Court decisions reflected the
became the central First Amendment test in respect to political advocacy and criminal law,
federal and state, more than a half-century ago.”).
Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447.
Id. at 449–50 (Black, J., concurring).
Id. at 447.
Tinker v. Des Moines, 393 U.S. 503, 514 (1969).
Id. at 510–11.
Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 16, 26 (1971) (indicating both the expression of emotion
and ideas are protected under the First Amendment).
Id. at 26.
Bd. of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 871–72 (1982) (finding that school board authority
does not supersede that of the First Amendment regarding ideas).
Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 399, 418 (1989).
65
66
67
68
69
70

71
72

73
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atmosphere of social unrest occurring across the country; a possible
acknowledgment that (largely) unfettered speech is a necessary conduit for
change.

3.

Extra-Governmental Equivocation

Looking outside the realm of government, the American Civil
Liberties Union (ACLU), perhaps the staunchest (and oldest, at 97 years)
advocacy group for First Amendment protections, recently engaged in a
reversal of course. In 2017, the ACLU of Virginia successfully litigated on
behalf of an “alt-right” activist, claiming his First Amendment rights were
being denied by the city’s refusal to allow his group to engage in a public
“Unite the Right” march. 74 Amid criticism for supporting a hate group,
Anthony Romero, the Executive Director of the ACLU, justified the
group’s position, responding that “[p]reventing the government from
controlling speech is absolutely necessary to the promotion of equality.” 75
After a bystander, Heather Heyer, was intentionally run down (and killed)
at that rally, some ACLU chapters declared they no longer believed freespeech protections apply to events like the one in Charlottesville. 76 Mr.
Romero promised that the entire ACLU would “screen clients more closely
for the potential of violence” and would no longer defend hate groups if
they protest while carrying guns. 77 While the ACLU is not expressing a
capricious ideological shift, this indecisiveness exemplifies the vacillating
boundaries of the First Amendment.
Another example of First Amendment hedging is social media
platform Twitter’s recent prohibition of posts that wish a person, including
the President, death, disease, or serious bodily harm. 78 This is a major policy
reversal as, since its inception in 2006, Twitter has been infamous for
Kessler v. City of Charlottesville, 441 F. Supp. 3d 277 (W.D. Va. 2020); see also Kessler
v. Charlottsville, ACLU VIRGINIA, https://acluva.org/en/cases/kessler-v-charlottesville
74

[https://perma.cc/D773-MVXH].
Anthony D. Romero, Equality, Justice and the First Amendment, ACLU BLOG (Aug. 15,
2017),
https://www.aclu.org/blog/free-speech/equality-justice-and-firstamendment?redirect=blog/speak-freely/equality-justice-and-first-amendment
[https://perma.cc/KN2T-963B].
Dara Lind, Why the ACLU is Adjusting its Approach to “Free Speech” After
Charlottesville, VOX (Aug. 21, 2017), https://www.vox.com/2017/8/20/16167870/aclu-hatespeech-nazis-charlottesville [https://perma.cc/RDJ8-3ET4].
Joe Palazzolo, ACLU Will No Longer Defend Hate Groups Protesting with Firearms,
WALL ST. J. (Aug. 17, 2017), https://www.wsj.com/articles/aclu-changes-policy-on-defendinghate-groups-protesting-with-firearms-1503010167 [https://perma.cc/NWA9-L5KG].
Bobby Allyn, Facebook, Twitter and TikTok Say Wishing Trump’s Death From COVID19 Is Not Allowed, NPR (Oct. 2, 2020), https://www.npr.org/sections/latest-updates-trumpcovid-19-results/2020/10/02/919778961/facebook-twitter-and-tiktok-say-wishing-trumpsdeath-from-covid-is-not-allowed [https://perma.cc/M38U-DT4N].
75

76

77

78
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allowing hurtful speech to reach its users in the name of the First
Amendment. 79

C.

Some Exceptions to First Amendment Protections

Amid the back and forth discussed in the Section above, 80 the
Supreme Court illustrated its reluctance to expand the list of precedented
exceptions to protected speech. In addition to false statements, two more
categories of unprotected speech are “fighting words” and obscenity. 81 The
Supreme Court explained in detail:
[I]t is well understood that the right of free speech is not
absolute at all times and under all circumstances. There are
certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech,
the prevention and punishment of which have never been
thought to raise any Constitutional problem. These include
the lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the
insulting or ‘fighting’ words—those which by their very
utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate
breach of the peace. 82
The Minnesota Supreme Court was of a similar mind in In re
Welfare of A.J.B. 83 The court stated that “the legitimate purpose of the
[mail-harassment] statute [is to] prevent harm,” 84 concurring that exceptions
may be warranted when they would prevent injury to another.

1.

Fighting Words

There is good reason and precedent for exempting fighting words
from protected speech. As the Supreme Court emphasized in Chaplinsky,
“‘Resort[ing] to epithets or personal abuse is not in any proper sense
communication of information or opinion safeguarded by the Constitution,
and its punishment as a criminal act would raise no question under that
instrument.’” 85 When compared with freedom of expression, the Court

Tweets Wishing for Trump’s Death Violate Twitter Policy, Company Says, GUARDIAN
(Oct. 2, 2020), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2020/oct/02/twitter-trump-deaththreats-covid-19-policy [https://perma.cc/38GN-M56P].
Supra, Part II (B)(2).
KATHLEEN ANN RUANE, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND
PRESS: EXCEPTIONS TO THE FIRST AMENDMENT 1 (2014).
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571–72 (1942).
In re Welfare of A.J.B., 929 N.W.2d 840 (Minn. 2019).
Id. at 861.
Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572 (quoting Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 309–10
(1940)).
79

80
81

82
83
84
85
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reasoned that fighting words may, indeed, have expressive intent, but that
the expression is not worthy of protection given the harm it causes. 86
In addition to words that “by their very utterance inflict injury,”
Chaplinsky’s unprotected fighting words include those that breach the
peace, 87 and in “practically all [such cases], the provocative language which
was held to amount to a breach of the peace consisted of profane, indecent,
or abusive remarks directed to the person of the hearer.” 88

2.

Obscenity

Obscenity is an oft-scrutinized category of speech exempted from
protection. 89 Similar to outlining the boundaries of “fighting words,” defining
“obscene” is challenging. 90 The present-day obscenity standard was set in
Miller v. California when the Court affirmed that obscene materials are not
protected expression under the First Amendment and created a standard
for the exception. 91 The three-prong test includes:
(a) whether “the average person, applying contemporary
community standards” would find that the work, taken as a
whole, appeals to the prurient interest . . . (b) whether the
work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way,
sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state
law; and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks
serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value. 92
The Miller test exemplifies the concept of protected speech
exceptions, but the Court remains hesitant to expand the definition (and,
thus, the amount of unprotected speech) any further. 93
Id. (“It has been well observed that such utterances are no essential part of any exposition
of ideas, and are such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived
from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality.”).

86

87
88
89

Id.
Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 309.
See, e.g., Ashcroft v. Am. C.L. Union, 542 U.S. 656, 679–80 (2004); Redrup v. New York,

386 U.S. 767, 770–72 (1967); A Book Named “John Cleland’s Memoirs of a Woman of
Pleasure” v. Att’y Gen. of Mass., 383 U.S. 413, 417–19 (1966); Roth v. United States, 354
U.S. 476, 484–85 (1957).
See, e.g., Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964), (Stewart, J., concurring) (conceding
he cannot precisely define obscenity, “[b]ut I know it when I see it.”).
Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973) (The third prong is adopted by legislatures as
a means for excepting protected speech in non-obscenity contexts as well, such as the
regulation of violent video games). See, e.g., Brown v. Ent. Merch. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 808
(2011).
Miller, 413 U.S. at 24. See, e.g., Brown, 564 U.S. at 808.
The Supreme Court denied certiorari in Mukasey v. Am. C.L. Union, 555 U.S. 1137
(2009), which could have broadened obscenity law beyond the parameters of the Miller test.
The lower court ruled in favor of the ACLU and protected speech. Am. C.L. Union v.
Mukasey, 534 F.3d 181 (3d Cir. 2008).
90

91

92
93
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The Argument for Purposeful Expansions

The intransigence to expand exceptions is a boon for First
Amendment advocates eager to maintain broad protection of speech, but
the hypocrisy and narrow concept of freedom are easy to spot. Courts have
cited child protection as a primary reason for limiting obscene expression. 94
For example, Ginsberg v. New York empowers the state to regulate the wellbeing of its children. 95 The Court said that “even where there is an invasion
of protected freedoms ‘the power of the state to control children’s conduct
reaches beyond the scope of its authority over adults . . . .’” 96 The priorities
of our society are laid bare, then, when protecting minors from (one might
embellish the notion as “freedom from”) such tangible evils as bullying,
harassment, and inducement to suicide do not triumph over free speech in
the way sharing pornographic content might have.
Even if a new category of exception for bullying and hate speech
is not warranted, Chaplinsky reminds us that such categories of speech are
much closer to the allowable exception of “fighting words” than the
communication of an idea. Because these words can easily be construed as
“abusive,” they pass Cantwell’s “breach the peace” test and should have
qualified as fighting words. 97
Overall hesitance to reduce certain instances of First Amendment
protection appears to be based on fear of a societal slippery slope. 98 The
thinking is that if an exception to First Amendment speech protection is
created, any and all free speech (and democracy itself) is put at risk: “If we
start punishing speech, advocates argue, then we will slide down the slippery
slope to tyranny.” 99 However, over time the Supreme Court increased
exceptions to protected speech to include obscenity, fighting words, and
defamatory statements, 100 and Americans continue to enjoy broad protection
of ideas and expression. At the same time, we remain vulnerable to bullying
See Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 638 (1968) (“We do not regard New York’s
regulation in defining obscenity on the basis of its appeal to minors under 17 as involving an
invasion of such minors’ constitutionally protected freedoms.”).
94

95
96

Id.
Id. (quoting Prince v. Mass., 321 U.S. 158, 170 (1944)).

Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942) (referencing Cantwell v.
Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 309–10 (1940)).
Alan M. Dershowitz, A Dangerous Slippery Slope, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 10, 2014),
https://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2010/09/19/can-speech-be-limited-for-publicworkers/a-dangerous-slippery-slope [https://perma.cc/S33M-DAAJ].
Kent Greenfield, The Limits of Free Speech, THE ATLANTIC (Mar. 13, 2015),
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/03/the-limits-of-free-speech/387718/
[https://perma.cc/QG9H-KW42].
See, e.g., Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 15 (1973) (discussing obscenity); Chaplinsky,
315 U.S. at 573 (discussing fighting words); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254
(1964) (discussing defamation).
97

98

99

100
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and stalking. 101 It is no surprise that the issue of whether an expansion of
exceptions to protected speech is more or less a public good is a question
that continues to vex our courts.

D. Free Speech in Minnesota
In re Welfare of A.J.B. is a Minnesota case dealing with state
102

police powers (those that establish and enforce laws protecting the welfare,
safety, and health of the public). 103 Because these powers are reserved to the
states, 104 it is germane to this analysis to examine Minnesota’s own
inconsistent history of free speech jurisprudence.
In 1981, a Minnesota free speech case, Near v. Minnesota, found
its way to the Supreme Court and was so impactful that it was
contemporaneously recognized as a game-changer. 105 “Contemporaries saw
Near as a landmark, with one legal commentator on freedom of the press
characterizing the case as ‘the most important decision rendered since the
adoption of the [F]irst [A]mendment.’” 106 In 1925, Minnesota passed a
statute known as the Minnesota Gag Law, which permitted a judge, acting
without a jury, to stop publication of any periodical the judge found
“obscene, lewd, and lascivious” or “malicious, scandalous, and
defamatory.” 107 The statute permitted periodicals’ permanent enjoinment
from future publication. 108
The Minnesota Supreme Court opinion, from which Near
(reviewed sub nom) 109 was granted certiorari, embraced the supremacy of
state police power and rejected the idea that First Amendment freedoms
outweighed issues of public welfare. 110 The court held:
Under modern authorities there can be no doubt that the
police power includes all regulations designed to promote
public convenience, happiness, general welfare, and
prosperity, an orderly state of society, the comfort of the
101
102
103

See, e.g., infra Part III.A.

929 N.W.2d 840 (Minn. 2019).

Police Power, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).

U.S. CONST. amend. X.
Paul L. Murphy, Near v. Minnesota in the Context of Historical Developments, 66 MINN.
L. REV. 95, 97 (1981).
Id. (quoting Eberhard P. Deutsch, Freedom of the Press and of the Mails, 36 MICH. L.
REV. 703, 749 (1938)).
Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 702 (1931) (quoting Mason's Minnesota Statutes, 1927,
§§ 10123-1–1203-3).
Id. at 703.
Sub Nomine, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed., 2019) (“[I]ndicate[s] that there has
been a name change from one stage of the case to another.”).
State ex rel. Olson v. Guilford, 174 Minn. 457, 459 (1928) (citing Lawton v. Steele, 152
U.S. 133, 140 (1894)).
104
105

106

107

108
109

110
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people, and peace, and that it extends to all great public
needs as well as to regulations designed to promote public
health, morals, or safety. 111
The court also believed the legislature had the authority and right
to decide both what is in the public’s best interest and how to protect those
interests. 112
The Near Court reversed, however, prioritizing the press’s First
Amendment protections over public welfare. 113 This principle was
successively applied to free speech in general. 114 Tugs-of-war between these
oft-competing freedoms continue to dominate in Minnesota. 115
Minnesota’s Constitution is silent on any guarantee of freedom of
speech and expression. 116 However, the First Amendment applies to the
states through the Fourteenth Amendment, 117 which is codified in
Minnesota’s Constitution. 118
Free speech protection rulings by the Minnesota Supreme Court
mirror the inconsistent holdings of the Supreme Court. In Knudtson v. City
of Coates, Minnesota favored police powers over First Amendment rights. 119
The court held that a city ordinance barring nude dancing in licensed liquor
establishments was a reasonable exercise of police power 120 and did not
violate the free speech provision of the Minnesota Constitution 121 (and, thus,
the First Amendment). 122 Similar modern Minnesota cases abound. 123 State
111
112
113
114

Id.
Id.
Near, 283 U.S. at 737–38.
Id. at 707 (“[The Minnesota gag rule] raises questions of grave importance transcending

the local interests involved in the particular action. It is no longer open to doubt that the
liberty of the press and of speech is within the liberty safeguarded by the due process clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment from invasion of state action.”) (emphasis added).
Compare Knudtson v. City of Coates, 519 N.W.2d 166, 169 (Minn. 1994) (detailing a
narrow free speech ruling), with State v. Hensel, 901 N.W.2d 166 (Minn. 2017).
See MINN. CONST. art. I.
See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (applying the first ten amendments of the United States
Constitution to the states); see also Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925) (“[W]e
may and do assume that freedom of speech and of the press . . . are among the fundamental
personal rights and ‘liberties’ protected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment from impairment by the States.”).
MINN. CONST. art. I, § 2.
See Knudtson, 519 N.W.2d at 169 (“The [municipality’s] police power may be used to
protect . . . ‘the public health, safety, and general welfare’ of the community.”).
Id. at 169.
115

116
117

118
119

120
121
122

Id.
See U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of

speech . . . .”).
For cases that detail a lack of statutory overbreadth see, State v. Muccio, 890 N.W.2d 914
(Minn. 2017); DI MA Corp. v. St. Cloud, 562 N.W.2d 312 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997); State v.
Kakosso, No. A12–0401, 2012 WL 6652598 (Minn. Ct. App. Dec. 24, 2012).
123
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v. Hensel, however, illustrates Minnesota’s converse stance, invalidating the

disorderly conduct statute as overbroad and, thus, violative of the First
Amendment. 124 Similar modern Minnesota cases abound. 125
Recent Minnesota rulings also embody the inconsistency in the
state courts’ definition and application of “fighting words.” Calling a police
officer a “white racist mother***ker” and wishing his mother would die
were considered fighting words and, thus, unprotected by the First
Amendment. 126 However, yelling “fuck you all” to a police officer and
security personnel at a nightclub did not qualify as the use of fighting words
and was, therefore, protected speech. 127
Serving as a bookend to this Section, the Supreme Court recently
heard another First Amendment Minnesota case, further demonstrating the
delicate balance between freedom of speech and freedom from speech. 128 A
Minnesota statute prohibits individuals from wearing a “political badge,
political button, or other political insignia” inside a polling location. 129
Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Roberts explained that some forms
of advocacy should be excluded from the polling place due to the sensitive
and private nature of voting. 130 In this holding, the Supreme Court expressed
the importance of being flexible, rather than absolute, when it comes to
protecting speech, and particularly when the recipient is vulnerable. 131 This
is a lesson the A.J.B. court should have heeded. Would that the A.J.B. court
took notice.
III.

A.

IN RE WELFARE OF A.J.B.

Facts and Procedural Posture

In 2016, A.J.B., a juvenile, sent approximately forty vicious,
personal messages on Twitter, directed at M.B., a juvenile diagnosed with
autism and Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder. 132 The messages
contained homophobic language, insults, and slurs, mocked M.B.’s

State v. Hensel, 901 N.W.2d 166 (Minn. 2017).
For cases that affirm statutory overbreadth see, State v. Jorgenson, 946 N.W.2d 596 (Minn.
2020); State v. Peterson, 936 N.W.2d 912 (Minn. Ct. App. 2019); Polinsky v. Bolton, No.
3:11CR190, 2017 WL 2224391 (Minn. Ct. App. May 22, 2017).
State v. Clay, No. CX-99-343, 1999 WL 711038, at *4 (Minn. Ct. App. Sept. 14, 1999).
Cornelious v. Brubaker, No. 01CV1254, 2003 WL 21511125, at *14 (D. Minn. June 25,
2003).
Minnesota Voters All. v. Mansky, 138 S. Ct. 1876 (2018).
Id. at 1879.
Id. at 1887.
Id. at 1885.
In re Welfare of A.J.B., 929 N.W.2d 840, 844 (Minn. 2019).
124
125

126
127

128
129
130
131
132
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disabilities, and encouraged M.B. to kill himself. 133 The tweets were sent
within a two- to three-hour period, and were designed to “teach [M.B.] a
lesson.” 134 After viewing these tweets, M.B. felt suicidal. 135 A.J.B. was charged
under the Minnesota stalking-by-mail and mail-harassment statutes. 136
Subsequently, the juvenile court found A.J.B. “delinquent” on all counts. 137
In its opinion, the juvenile court said the tweets were “cruel and [went]
beyond any measure of human decency.” 138 A.J.B. appealed, and the
Minnesota Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s decision. 139

B.

Minnesota Supreme Court

Under a theory of constitutional overbreadth, A.J.B. appealed the
Minnesota Court of Appeals’ decision to the Minnesota Supreme Court. 140
Of concern to the court was the balance between the chilling effect resulting
from the proscription of constitutionally-protected speech and the
protections afforded by the stalking-by-mail and mail-harassment statutes. 141
Following the Supreme Court’s example, the court laid out a three-factor
test to determine whether a statute is overbroad in the context of the spirit
in which it was drafted. 142
First, the court must understand the scope and sweep of the
statute. 143 Second, the court determines whether the statute prohibits
protected speech or expressive conduct. 144 If so, the third and final factor is
whether the amount of speech prohibited is “substantial” relative to the
amount of prohibited, unprotected speech. 145 If the court finds the statute to
be overbroad and unconstitutional, it must ascertain whether the statute can
be saved by severing the overbroad language. 146

133
134
135
136
137
138
139
140
141

Id. at 845.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 846.
Id. at 847 (“[W]e tread carefully as we balance the constitutional demands of the First

Amendment against society’s interest in protecting Minnesotans’ safety, health, and
welfare.”).

Id. at 847–48; see also United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285,
293 (2008) (discussing how to determine if a statute is overbroad).
142

143
144
145
146

A.J.B., 929 N.W.2d at 847.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 848.
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In the case at hand, the Minnesota Supreme Court analyzed both
the stalking-by-mail and the mail-harassment statutes. 147 Concerning the
stalking-by-mail statute, 148 the court found the language—particularly with
regard to the negligence standard and wide-ranging potential victim
reactions—to be overbroad. 149 The court determined the scope and sweep of
the statute was “substantial” and “tethered closely to speech or expressive
conduct.” 150 As to the second interpretive factor, the court recalled its prior
finding that it is not enough for the offending speech itself to be illegal, but
that the conduct related to the speech must be illegal. 151 In this case, the
statute did not criminalize speech because it was connected to a criminal
act; rather, “the statute criminalizes the communication itself . . . .” 152
Therefore, this finding indicated to the court that the statute prohibited
protected speech. To the final element of substantiality, the court found
that, while the statute covered both protected and unprotected speech, the
proportion of protected speech was high enough to be considered
“substantial.” 153 The court stated that because of the “substantial ways in
which subdivision 2(6) can prohibit and chill protected expression, we
conclude that the statute facially violates the First Amendment overbreadth
doctrine.” 154
The court also interpreted the mail-harassment statute 155 using
dictionary definitions, but it said the terms must be used in context. 156 They
also found that this statute required an intention “to cause a specific type of

147
148
149

Id. at 848–51, 857–59.

MINN. STAT. § 609.749, subdiv. 2(b)(6) (2020).

A.J.B., 929 N.W.2d at 851 (“[The statute] criminalizes the mailing or delivery of any form

of communication that an actor directs more than once at a specific person who the actor
‘knows or has reason to know’ would cause (after considering the victim’s specific life
circumstances) [and does cause] that person to feel ‘frightened, threatened, oppressed,
persecuted, or intimidated . . . .’”) (quoting MINN. STAT. § 609.749, subdiv. 1).

Id.
Id. at 852 (citing State v. Melchert-Dinkel, 844 N.W.2d 13, 20 (Minn. 2014)); see also id.
(citing Eugene Volokh, The “Speech Integral to Criminal Conduct” Exception, 101
CORNELL L. REV. 981, 1011 (2016)) (“It is not enough that the speech itself be labeled illegal
conduct . . . Rather, it must help cause or threaten other illegal conduct . . . which may make
150
151

restricting the speech a justifiable means of preventing that other conduct.”).
152
153
154

Id.
Id. at 853.
Id. at 856 (emphasis added).

MINN. STAT. § 609.795, subdiv. 1(3) (2018) (“Whoever does any of the following is guilty
of a misdemeanor . . . (3) with the intent to harass or intimidate another person, repeatedly
mails or delivers or causes the delivery by any means, including electronically, of letters,
telegrams, or packages . . . .”).
A.J.B., 929 N.W.2d at 858 (“[The court must] keep[] in mind the context of the statute
which is focused on the intent of the person sending and the reactions of the person receiving
letters, telegrams, or packages.”).

155

156
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harm,” but the victim need not suffer any actual harm. 157 For the second
factor, the court decided statutorily that the proscribed speech was not
independently related to criminal conduct. 158 Unlike the stalking-by-mail
statute, this provision did not require the victim to suffer a tangible harm or
experience actual abuse. The only requirement is that the actor intended
the victim to suffer. 159 Third, the court similarly determined the amount of
protected speech prohibited in the statute was substantial when compared
with “the statute’s plainly legitimate sweep.” 160 It concluded the only
legitimate purpose in prohibiting the mailing of an item with the intent to
cause harm is to prevent said harm from happening. 161 Therefore, with no
requirement for harm to actually occur, “the Legislature criminalized
behavior, including substantial speech and expressive conduct, that will have
no impact on the statute’s legitimate purpose of preventing harm.” 162
After determining both statutes to be constitutionally overbroad,
the Minnesota Supreme Court examined the potential to remedy the
statutes by severing the problematic language. 163 The court determined the
stalking-by-mail statute could not be saved, as severing the necessary
language would disconnect the statute from its legislative intent 164 and render
it “incapable of being executed.” 165 On the contrary, the court found that the
mail-harassment statute could be sufficiently narrowed by severing the
overbroad language (“disturb, or cause distress”), 166 thereby saving the
statute. 167
Given the invalidation of the statute, the court reversed the lower
court’s decision regarding the stalking-by-mail verdict. 168 On the mailharassment verdict, the court remanded the case to the juvenile court to be
adjudicated under the redrawn statute. 169 Three justices dissented in part,

157
158
159
160
161
162
163
164

Id. at 858–59.
Id. at 859.
Id. at 858–59.
Id. at 860.
Id. at 861.
Id.
Id. at 856.
Id. at 847 (“The Legislature’s interest in protecting all Minnesotans, and particularly our

more vulnerable neighbors, from such conduct is proper and serious.”).
Id. at 856 (citing State v. Hensel, 901 N.W.2d 166, 179 (2017) (“We cannot rewrite the
statute to narrow it . . . . It would be ‘inconsistent with the statute’s text’ . . . . We conclude
that there are legitimate reasons to doubt that the Legislature would have enacted Minn. Stat.
§ 609.749, subd. 1, without the negligence standard.”) (internal citations omitted).
Id. at 857 (citing MINN. STAT. § 609.795, subdiv. 1(3), as original); see also id. at 863 (citing
MINN. STAT. § 609.795, subdiv. 1(3), as amended).
Id. at 863.
Id. at 864.
165

166

167
168
169

Id.
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arguing the court had enough factual evidence from the juvenile court to
affirm the decision, even under the newly narrowed statute. 170
IV.

A.

ANALYSIS

The Overbreadth of A.J.B.

Under the free speech overbreadth doctrine, a litigant argues that
a statute should be struck down because it could be applied
unconstitutionally in certain hypothetical fact patterns and those situations
substantially outweigh the number of potential constitutional applications. 171
Laws that encompass any (or too much) protected speech foster an
environment ripe for complicated legal overbreadth challenges. 172 In United
States v. Williams, the Court simplified this issue: “The [overbreadth]
doctrine seeks to strike a balance between competing social costs.” 173
The Supreme Court’s overbreadth doctrine is mirrored on the
state level by the Minnesota Supreme Court’s ruling in A.J.B., 174 which
exemplifies the doctrine’s complexity. To determine the sweep of the
Minnesota statutes, the court painstakingly defined the words central to the
statutes: “stalking,” “deliver,” “repeatedly,” “disturb,” “distress,” and
“abuse.” 175 These words can be viewed as legitimately protected speech, such
as “delivering” letters to “disturb” an elected official. 176 At the same time, the
court recognized there is no legitimate rationale for the word “abuse” to be
swept into protected speech, commenting, “unlike the terms ‘disturb’ and
‘distress,’ the term ‘abuse’ is more narrowly cast and the injury intended

Id. at 865 (Chutich, J., concurring).
Meier, supra note 51 at 131–32.
Christopher A. Pierce, “The Strong Medicine” of the Overbreadth Doctrine: When
Statutory Exceptions are No More than a Placebo, 64 FED. COM. L.J. 177, 182 (2011)

170
171
172

(explaining the two purposes of the overbreadth doctrine: (1) to prevent the chilling of
protected speech; and (2) to incentivize legislatures to tailor their statutes narrowly, so as not
to face constitutional challenges).
United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 292 (2008) (comparing the chill on free speech
with the invalidation of constitutionally sound laws that protect individuals from “antisocial”
conduct).
A.J.B., 929 N.W.2d at 847 (“[W]e tread carefully as we balance the constitutional demands
of the First Amendment against society’s interest in protecting Minnesotans’ safety, health,
and welfare.”).
Id. at 849, 858–59. It is important to read these definitions to understand the impact these
words have, beyond the broad scope of the terms. See, e.g., BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY
(11th ed. 2019) which defines “abuse” as “physical or mental maltreatment, often resulting
in mental, emotional, sexual, or physical injury.” This specificity exhibits the magnitude of
harm as well as the reach of the conduct.
A.J.B., 929 N.W.2d at 853.
173

174

175

176
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much more substantial.” 177 Therein lies the precarious balancing act thrust
upon the court.
In Williams, the Court provided specificity to the overbreadth
doctrine and when a statute can be invalidated. 178 The Court stated, “[i]n
order to maintain an appropriate balance, we have vigorously enforced the
requirement that a statute’s overbreadth be substantial, not only in an
absolute sense, but also relative to the statute’s plainly legitimate sweep.” 179
The Court reasoned that the competing social costs of the “free exchange
of ideas” and conduct that is “so antisocial that it has been made criminal”
must be weighed. 180
The A.J.B. court seemed to employ a similar “substantiality” test
when it asked, “Does the statute prohibit a ‘substantial amount of
constitutionally protected speech[?]’” 181 The court found that the Minnesota
statute at issue contained both protected and unprotected expression, but
the court had to determine which expression substantially tipped the scale. 182
The court reasoned that the terms used in the statute were broad enough
that delivering a complaint letter meant to “cause distress” to a politician or
businessperson would be criminalized, and this expression is protected. 183

B.

“Strong Medicine”

Courts recognize how drastic a measure it is to nullify or modify
a statute, noting that “invalidation for overbreadth is ‘strong medicine’ that
is not to be ‘casually employed.’” 184 Therefore, consideration is often given
to legislative intent when weighing free speech against statutory
protections. 185 The Minnesota Legislature’s clear intent in devising the
Id. at 863.
Williams, 553 U.S. at 292.
Id.
Id.
A.J.B., 929 N.W.2d at 847 (quoting State v. Hensel, 901 N.W.2d 166, 171–72 (Minn.
2017)); see also supra Part IV.A (discussing the overbreadth doctrine).
A.J.B., 929 N.W.2d at 847.
Id. at 862.
See Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 613 (1973) (“Application of the overbreadth
doctrine . . . has been employed by the Court sparingly and only as a last resort.”); accord
177
178
179
180
181

182
183
184

State v. Turner, 864 N.W.2d 204, 207 (Minn. Ct. App. 2015) (quoting N.Y. Club Ass’n, Inc.
v. City of New York, 487 U.S. 1, 14 (1988)) (“Applying the overbreadth doctrine to invalidate
a statute . . . is a ‘strong medicine’ that should be ‘used sparingly and only as a last resort.’”).
See also Williams, 553 U.S. at 293 (quoting Los Angeles Police Dep’t v. United Reporting
Publ’g Corp., 528 U.S. 32, 39 (1999)).
See Lawrence M. Solan, Private Language, Public Laws: The Central Role of Legislative
Intent in Statutory Interpretation, 93 GEO. L. J. 427, 435 (2005) (“[L]aws are written in
language and language can only be understood in context.”); see also Wisconsin Pub.
Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597, 610 n.4 (1991) (“As for the propriety of using legislative
history at all, common sense suggests that inquiry benefits from reviewing additional
185
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stalking-by-mail and mail harassment statutes was to protect the most
vulnerable citizens from “bullying, stalking, and other forms of
harassment.” 186
The A.J.B. court, however, preferred to guard against the chilling
effect on speech that could result instead of upholding the spirit of and
protections provided by the statutes. 187 It reasoned that to avoid a chilling
effect, it must not expand exceptions to protected speech, despite what the
Minnesota Legislature intended. 188 The court cited the Supreme Court’s
holding in United States v. Stevens: “‘Our decisions . . . cannot be taken as
establishing a freewheeling authority to declare new categories of speech
outside the scope of the First Amendment.’” 189 Notably, however, the A.J.B.
court neglected to recognize the portion of the Stevens opinion—in the same
paragraph—that (1) opened the door for future expansion of protected
speech exceptions and (2) admonished the government’s flawed process for
doing so. 190 The Stevens Court stated: “We need not foreclose the future
recognition of such additional categories [of speech outside the scope of the
First Amendment] to reject the Government’s highly manipulable balancing
test as a means of identifying them.” 191 The A.J.B. court could have used that
rationale to widen the scope of protected exceptions.
The Minnesota Supreme Court examined the federal stalking
statute for comparison to see if it could allow the Minnesota statute to
stand. 192 The federal law penalizes whoever:
with the intent to kill, injure, harass, intimidate, or place
under surveillance with intent to kill, injure, harass, or
intimidate another person, uses the mail, any interactive
computer service or electronic communication system of
interstate commerce, or any other facility of interstate or
foreign commerce to engage in a course of conduct that (A)
places that person in reasonable fear of the death of or
serious bodily injury to [the] person or a [family member];
or (B) causes, attempts to cause, or would be reasonably

information rather than ignoring it. . . Our precedents demonstrate that the Court’s practice
of utilizing legislative history reaches well into its past. We suspect that the practice will
likewise reach well into the future.”) (citation omitted).
A.J.B., 929 N.W.2d at 847 (Minn. 2019).
Id. at 855, 863.
Id. at 851 (“[T]he Legislature cannot save a statute that is otherwise unconstitutionally
overbroad by including language stating that the statute does not reach speech or expression
protected by the First Amendment.”).
Id. at 846 (quoting United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 472 (2010)).
Stevens, 559 U.S. at 472.
186
187
188

189
190
191
192

Id.
A.J.B., 929 N.W.2d at 855.
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expected to cause substantial emotional distress to [the]
person [or a family member]. 193
When challenged, courts have ruled that the federal statute is not
overbroad. 194 The Minnesota Supreme Court found that, unlike the federal
statute, the state stalking statute did not require intent. 195 Therefore, the
potential for the act occurring negligently could facilitate a chilling effect on
speech. 196 The federal statute also required a higher burden regarding the
victim’s reaction to stalking than the state statute. 197
The court did not work hard enough to maintain the protections
provided by the stalking-by-mail statute using the federal statute as a guide. 198
The federal stalking statute only applies when a person acts with an “intent
to kill, injure, harass, intimidate, or place under surveillance with intent to
kill, injure, harass, or intimidate another person.” 199 Given that the court
understood the intent of the Minnesota Legislature to lean toward the
protection and well-being of its citizens, 200 using the federal statute’s
“malicious intent” standard, it could have applied that standard to the
Minnesota statute. This application would provide a narrower sweep of
speech and create a higher burden while maintaining protections for
children like M.B.
While the A.J.B. court said it was limited by the overbreadth
doctrine and the substantial amount of non-protected speech in the statutes,
it missed an opportunity to further criminalize A.J.B.’s actions and speech.
In addition to A.J.B.’s speech qualifying as fighting words, 201 the court
discounted Williams, which stated that obscene speech is not protected by
the First Amendment when it “violates fundamental notions of decency[.]” 202
193
194

Id. at 854 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 2261A(2) (2018)).
Id.; see, e.g., United States v. Ackell, 907 F.3d 67, 77 (1st Cir. 2018), cert. denied; United

States v. Petrovic, 701 F.3d 849, 856 (8th Cir. 2012).
A.J.B., 929 N.W.2d at 855.
Compare MINN. STAT. § 609.749, subdiv. 5(a) (2020) (“knows or has reason to know” the
victim would be upset; no intent or knowledge that behavior will harm another person) with
18 U.S.C. § 2261A(1) (2018) (must have “intent to kill, injure, harass, intimidate, or place
under surveillance . . . .”) (emphasis added).
A.J.B., 929 N.W.2d at 855 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2261A(2)) (“The federal statute requires
proof that a person’s conduct placed the victim or the victim’s family member in ‘reasonable
fear of [] death [] or serious bodily injury’ or ‘causes, attempts to cause, or would be
reasonably expected to cause substantial emotional distress’ to the victim or a family member
of the victim.”).
See United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 307 (2008) (Stevens, J. concurring) (quoting
Hooper v. California, 155 U.S. 648, 657 (1895) “[E]very reasonable construction must be
resorted to, in order to save a statute from unconstitutionality.”); see also 18 U.S.C. §
2261A(2) (federal stalking statute).
18 U.S.C. § 2261A(1) (emphasis added).
A.J.B., 929 N.W.2d at 861.
Supra Part II.C.3.
Williams, 553 U.S. at 288.
195
196

197

198

199
200
201
202
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So, too, should speech such as A.J.B.’s be unprotected as it was indisputably
and fundamentally indecent. 203
Early in its A.J.B. analysis, the Minnesota Supreme Court
acknowledged that, while the legislature must craft legislation in step with
the First Amendment, protecting Minnesota’s most vulnerable citizens from
harassment is simultaneously “proper and serious.” 204 In fact, the dissenting
opinion felt so certain about A.J.B.’s motivation to “abuse” M.B. that it did
not see the need to remand the case back to the juvenile court and was
prepared to affirm the delinquency disposition. 205 Justice Chutich felt that
there was no doubt that A.J.B. “specifically intended to abuse M.B.” and
that there was “overwhelming evidence of A.J.B.’s abusive tweets,
threatening violence, encouraging suicide, and otherwise demeaning and
harassing a vulnerable M.B.” 206 Given the undisputed facts, the court did not
need to remand the case back to juvenile court. The court could also have
noted that A.J.B.’s expression was not, by its nature and intention,
protected. Instead, the court chose to dispense its “medicine” sparingly.

C.

Speech as Conduct

Speech we simply do not like or agree with, or even speech that
offends, should undoubtedly be protected. 207 However, when a person is left
vulnerable to dangerous, harmful conduct hiding behind the shield of First
Amendment speech security, we must examine which protection should
receive priority.
There is federal precedent for treating expression as conduct and
weighing that freedom with emotional injury: the Supreme Court
overturned Plessy v. Ferguson in part because of the psychological harm
inflicted on children of color due to the conduct manifesting as an
expression of segregationist ideas. 208 In Plessy, the Court considered the
harm “separate but equal” legislation caused the plaintiffs to be a “fallacy,”
See Elizabeth H. Steele, Examining the FCC’s Indecency Regulations in Light of Today’s
Technology, 63 FED. COMM. L.J. 289, 295 (2010) (The FCC deemed indecent language “that
203

which is ‘patently offensive by contemporary community standards; and . . . utterly without
redeeming social value.’”). It would be difficult to argue that A.J.B.’s words did not fit this
definition of “indecent.”
A.J.B., 929 N.W.2d at 847.
Id. at 867 (Chutich, J., concurring).

204
205
206
207

Id.
See, e.g., Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (stating that the best remedy for

speech with which we disagree or find offensive is not censorship of that speech but more
speech).
Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954) (“To separate [children] from others of
similar age and qualifications solely because of their race generates a feeling of inferiority as
to their status in the community that may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever
to be undone.”).
208
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existing only because the plaintiffs chose to feel inferior. 209 The Brown Court
disagreed, 210 articulating that segregation expresses the denigration of
African-American children. 211 Brown saw that, under the cover of First
Amendment protection, public welfare was being harmed precisely because
the “expression” of segregation had “the sanction of the law[.]” 212 “Separate
but equal” as an idea “has no place,” said the Brown Court, despite being
an expression of an idea. 213
A justiciable argument persists over whether speech is barred
from First Amendment protection when it is, in effect, conduct. 214 Noted
cases about the right to burn the U.S. flag or protest government
involvement in a war show the Court’s interest in protecting conduct-related
expression. 215 But what about statements that, by their nature, are effectively
illegal conduct—which conduct is covered by applicable and prohibitive
laws? For example, publishing a book that intentionally explains how to
commit a crime may constitute aiding and abetting the described crime. 216
The Rice court explains: “[W]hile even speech advocating lawlessness has
long enjoyed protections under the First Amendment, it is equally well
established that speech which, in its effect, is tantamount to legitimately
proscribable non-expressive conduct may itself be legitimately proscribed,
punished, or regulated incidentally to the constitutional enforcement of
generally applicable statutes.” 217 Plainly, a law prohibiting certain conduct
may be applicable to speech that produces the effect of such illegal
conduct. 218

Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 551 (1896).
Brown, 347 U.S. at 494–95 (“Whatever may have been the extent of psychological
knowledge at the time of Plessy v. Ferguson, this finding [of the harm from segregation] is
amply supported by modern authority. Any language . . . contrary to this finding is rejected.”).
Id. at 494 (“Segregation of white and colored children in public schools has a detrimental
effect upon the colored children.”).
209
210

211

212
213
214

Id.
Id. at 495.
See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 399, 418 (1989); see also Tinker v. Des Moines, 393

U.S. 503, 514 (1969).
Johnson, 491 U.S. at 399, 418; see also Tinker, 393 U.S. at 514.
See Rice v. Paladin Enters., 128 F.3d 233, 267 (4th Cir. 1997); see also LAURENCE H.
TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 837 (2d ed. 1988) (“[T]he law need not treat
differently the crime of one man who sells a bomb to terrorists and that of another who
publishes an instructional manual for terrorists on how to build their own bombs out of old
Volkswagen parts.”).
Rice, 128 F.3d at 243.
See Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 669 (1991) (analogizing that if the press
conducts the illegal act of publishing copyrighted material, it is not immune from prosecution
simply because the press has general First Amendment protection); accord Associated Press
v. Nat’l Lab. Rels. Bd., 301 U.S. 103, 132 (1937) (“The publisher of a newspaper has no
special immunity from the application of general laws.”).
215
216

217
218
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Further illustrating the point that speech may qualify as illegal
conduct, the Supreme Court in R.A.V. v. St. Paul provided that there is no
First Amendment conflict when speech is imperiled because of generally
relevant laws. 219 The Court applied this reasoning only to speech that already
falls within existing First Amendment exceptions, like fighting words, 220 and
the A.J.B. court seemed to agree. 221 However, included among the R.A.V.
Court’s listed exceptions is “‘speech integral to criminal conduct.’” 222 This
would seem to bolster the Rice court’s holding that speech producing the
effect of illegal conduct is a permissible exception to First Amendment
protection. 223 Nonetheless, the A.J.B. court prioritized “balance” in its
analysis and chose to “tread carefully,” ultimately finding that only
historically sanctioned exceptions may apply. 224 Despite the existence of a
criminal federal stalking and harassment statute 225 and consideration of the
detrimental effects such conduct has on citizens, the Minnesota Supreme
Court did not consider either to be “speech integral to criminal conduct,”
at least not enough to reverse the lower court’s decision. 226
The A.J.B. court used Broadrick v. Oklahoma broadly to
determine whether the Minnesota statutes prohibited a substantial amount
of speech, 227 but ignored Broadrick’s reasoning that the potential for chilling
future speech is not the priority when public safety is threatened by conduct
masquerading as speech. 228 Arguably, in A.J.B., the defendant’s cruel words
were “true threats,” which, acting as conduct, are not protected by the First
Amendment. 229 M.B. is an individual diagnosed with autism—a fact known
R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 389 (1992) (The government may sweep up speech
“incidentally within the reach of a statute directed at conduct rather than speech.”).
Id.; see also id. at 382 (explaining that the Court has “narrowed the scope of the traditional
categorical exceptions” from First Amendment protections since the 1960s).
In re Welfare of A.J.B., 929 N.W.2d 840, 846 (Minn. 2019). The court, citing United
States v. Stevens, reasons that while “[t]here is a point where First Amendment protections
end and government regulation of speech or expressive conduct becomes permissible[,]”
there are limited, generally recognized exceptions, further noting that new exceptions should
not be considered lightly. (quotation at 559 U.S. 460, 472 (2010)).
219

220

221

222
223
224
225
226
227

Id.
See Rice v. Paladin Enters., 128 F.3d 233, 267 (4th Cir. 1997).
A.J.B., 929 N.W.2d at 847.
18 U.S.C. § 2261A(2) (2018).

A.J.B., 929 N.W.2d at 864.
Id. at 852.

Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 618 (1973).
See Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 344 (2003) (“[T]he First Amendment . . . permits a
State to ban ‘true threats,’ which encompass those statements where the speaker means to
communicate a serious expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful violence to a
particular individual or group of individuals.”) (internal citation omitted); see also R.A.V. v.
St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 388 (1992) (Threats of violence are First Amendment exceptions to
“protect[] individuals from the fear of violence, from the disruption that fear engenders, and
from the possibility that the threatened violence will occur.”).
228
229
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and exploited by A.J.B. 230 Given A.J.B.’s threats and hateful words, M.B.
feared being attacked if he returned to school. 231
The A.J.B. court further elucidated the concept of speech as
conduct when it noted that it is not enough to label speech alone as illegal,
but the conduct related to that speech must also be illegal. 232 A.J.B.’s speech
included repeatedly encouraging M.B. to commit suicide. 233 In its opinion,
the court references State v. Melchert-Dinkel, which held that expressive
language or action encouraging a person to commit suicide is protected
because the act of suicide itself is not illegal. 234 Given, however, that
Minnesota law does criminalize such behavior, 235 the A.J.B. court’s reliance
on Melchert-Dinkel 236 is perplexing.

D. The Value of Chilling Speech
A law that allegedly targets or deters free speech and expression
is said to have a “chilling effect.” 237 Given the limited exceptions discussed
above and the judiciary’s hesitance to expand them, statutes that chill speech
are frequently challenged and struck down as overbroad. 238 Because such
latitude protects hate speech and, debatably, resultant conduct, one might
question whether this bedrock protection does more harm than good.
Brandenburg v. Ohio demonstrated that hate speech is protected
under the First Amendment. 239 According to the Court, even speech that
advocates violence is protected, so long as it is not likely to produce
“imminent lawless action.” 240 The Ku Klux Klan is “the oldest and most
infamous of American hate groups,” 241 yet Brandenburg prioritized those
individuals’ hateful words and their incitement of others to commit violent
A.J.B., 929 N.W.2d at 845 (“One tweet contained a checkerboard of images with M.B.’s
face and a caption reading, ‘Click the Autistic Child.’”).
230

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. (quoting Eugene Volokh, The “Speech Integral to Criminal Conduct” Exception, 101
CORNELL L. REV. 981, 1011 (2016) (“It is not enough that the speech itself be labeled illegal
conduct . . . . Rather, it must help cause or threaten other illegal conduct . . . which may

231
232
233
234

make restricting the speech a justifiable means of preventing that other conduct.”).
MINN. STAT. § 609.215, subdiv. 1 (2020) (stating that “Whoever intentionally advises,
encourages, or assists another in taking the other’s own life may be sentenced to
imprisonment for not more than 15 years or to payment of a fine of not more than $30,000,
or both” including aiding attempted suicide).
A.J.B., 929 N.W.2d at 852.
See Jennifer M. Kinsley, Chill, 48 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 253, 255 (2016).
See supra Part II (C).
395 U.S. 444, 449 (1969).
Id. at 447.
Ku Klux Klan, SOUTHERN POVERTY LAW CENTER, https://www.splcenter.org/fightinghate/extremist-files/ideology/ku-klux-klan [https://perma.cc/F4Y6-DMT3].
235

236
237
238
239
240
241
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acts 242 over the negative effects their words no doubt cast on others. 243
However, John Powell, who represented the Ku Klux Klan when he was the
national legal director of the ACLU, now questions how much weight is
given to free speech over equality: “[w]hat if we weighed the two as
conflicting values, instead of this false formalism where the right to speech
is recognized but the harm caused by that speech is not?” 244 This is the
challenge of the Minnesota Supreme Court’s decision in A.J.B. Powell
exemplifies the thesis of this Paper when he ponders, “‘We need to protect
the rights of speakers . . . but what about protecting everyone else?’” 245
M.B.’s right to live free from harassment and bullying was not prioritized.
The balance between freedom of speech and freedom from
speech is historically complex and contestable, even for seasoned justices. 246
In a more modern context, this balance is no easier to achieve. In 2019, the
conviction of three members of the white supremacist “Rise Above
Movement” was overturned by a federal judge, citing the overbreadth
doctrine, despite the speech in question causing riots and physical attacks. 247
Yet, across the country, another federal judge reached the opposite
conclusion in a similar case involving different members of the same hate
group. 248 This issue may soon be in front of the Supreme Court to reconcile
the contradictory verdicts. 249

Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 448.
See, e.g., Brian Mullen & Joshua M. Smyth, Immigrant Suicide Rates as a Function of
Ethnophaulisms: Hate Speech Predicts Death, 66 PSYCHOSOMATIC MED. 343, 343 (2004)
242
243

(correlating increased suicide rates among victims of hate speech).
Andrew Marantz, How Social-Media Trolls Turned U.C. Berkeley Into A Free Speech
Circus,
NEW
YORKER
(June
25,
2018),
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2018/07/02/how-social-media-trolls-turned-ucberkeley-into-a-free-speech-circus [https://perma.cc/GJJ2-D94J].
Andrew Marantz, Free Speech is Killing Us, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 4, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/04/opinion/sunday/free-speech-social-mediaviolence.html [https://perma.cc/3XEU-83YC].
Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 452 (citing Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 673 (1925))
(quoting Holmes, J., dissenting) (“‘If in the long run the beliefs expressed in proletarian
dictatorship are destined to be accepted by the dominant forces of the community, the only
meaning of free speech is that they should be given their chance and have their way’ . . . .
We have never been faithful to the philosophy of that dissent.”).
Brian Melley, Judge: White Supremacist Group’s Actions Protected by Free Speech,
CHRISTIAN
SCI.
MONITOR
(June
5,
2019),
https://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Justice/2019/0605/Judge-White-supremacist-group-sactions-protected-by-free-speech [https://perma.cc/V93W-XYPM].
244

245

246

247

248
249

Id.
Id.
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While the intention of the Framers regarding the First
Amendment is unclear, 250 surely it was closer to the protection of a citizen’s
expression of a particular fact or idea, not to aid and abet harassment and
bullying. 251 This position is epitomized in Morse v. Frederick, which held
that schools are entitled to take steps to safeguard their students from speech
encouraging illegal drug use. 252 The Court compared its earlier and contrary
ruling in Tinker (upholding free expression in a school environment) with
that in Morse, arguing that the interest in deterring drug use by
schoolchildren greatly outweighs that of free speech protections: “The First
Amendment does not require schools to tolerate[,] at school events[,]
student expression that contributes to [the] dangers [of illegal drug use].” 253
The A.J.B. decision should have been no different with regard to the wellbeing and safety of a child outweighing another’s freedom of speech.
V.

A.

CURRENT TRENDS

The Wild, Wild Internet

In Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union, the Supreme Court
held that government regulation of speech communicated via the internet
was unconstitutional. 254 The Court even applied this reasoning to one
traditionally allowable exception: “the governmental interest in protecting
children from harmful materials . . . does not justify an unnecessarily broad
suppression of speech addressed to adults.” 255 The Court affirmed the lower
court’s ruling that First Amendment protections should not be qualified
because “the content on the Internet is as diverse as human thought.” 256 Of
all outlets for speech, Reno provided the First Amendment its broadest
sanctuary in the realm of the internet.
It is possible, however, that the Court’s prior understanding of the
internet may no longer be reasonable. 257 The Reno decision occurred in
1997 when the internet was just starting to boom. Google, Facebook, and
Jud Campbell, What did the First Amendment Originally Mean?, RICH. L. (July 9, 2018),
https://lawmagazine.richmond.edu/features/article/-/15500/what-did-the-first-amendmentoriginally-mean.html [https://perma.cc/B67F-A69W].
See discussion supra Part II.A.
Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 410 (2007).
250

251
252
253

Id.

Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 885 (1997) (“[G]overnmental regulation of the content of
speech is more likely to interfere with the free exchange of ideas than to encourage it.”).
Id. at 875 (internal citations omitted).
Id. at 870 (quoting ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 842 (E.D. Pa. 1996)).
See Marantz, supra note 244 (statement of University of California Berkeley Chancellor,
Carol Christ) (“Speech is fundamentally different in the digital context . . . . I don’t think the
law, or the country, has even started to catch up with that yet.”).
254

255
256
257
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Twitter did not yet exist. 258 Since then, we have seen the consequences of
free speech metastasizing into hateful, violent conduct. A prime example is
Heather Heyer’s death at the “Unite the Right” rally. 259 Her horrific death is
an oft-shared directive on social media. 260 The internet is full of posts
encouraging individuals to vehicularly run down civilians with different ideas
than their own. 261 “Run them over” is a popular catchphrase on social
media. 262 This kind of speech, rampant on the internet, is tantamount to
placing a weapon in someone’s hands and encouraging them to commit a
crime. 263
The Southern Poverty Law Center (“SPLC”) studied the
dangerous trajectory from idea to action, finding hate sites to be a common
denominator for an increase in white nationalist attacks. 264 In a speech about
hate speech on the internet before the United Nations High Commission
on Human Rights, Mark Potok, editor of the SPLC magazine Intelligence
Report, explains:
The Net gives racists unprecedented access to . . . teens[]
who live in their parents’ homes and have computers in
their bedrooms . . . [and] wouldn’t be caught dead at a Klan
rally . . . . The Net, with its promise of privacy, lowers any
social inhibitions they might have had about consorting
openly with racists and other haters. Where these teens
would likely have met social disapproval if they expressed
anti-Semitic or racist ideas at home or in school, they are

William Craig, The History of the Internet in a Nutshell, WEBFX (Nov. 15, 2009),
https://www.webfx.com/blog/web-design/the-history-of-the-internet-in-a-nutshell/
[https://perma.cc/X5M4-CNPK].
Maev Kennedy, Heather Heyer, Victim of Charlottesville Car Attack, was Civil Rights
Activist, THE GUARDIAN (Aug. 13, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/usnews/2017/aug/13/woman-killed-at-white-supremacist-rally-in-charlottesville-named
[https://perma.cc/758D-HQ2V].
See Henry Grabar, “Run Them Down”: Driving into Crowds of Protesters was a RightWing Fantasy Long Before the Violence in Charlottesville, SLATE (Aug. 14, 2017),
https://slate.com/business/2017/08/driving-into-crowds-of-protesters-was-a-right-wingfantasy-long-before-charlottesville.html [https://perma.cc/44XN-X9L5].
258

259

260

Id.
Id.
See Lind, supra note 76. The ACLU took a position on physical weapons at rallies but
continues to support speech that is a de facto weapon. Was the hate speech and incitement
to violence on alt-right and white supremacist websites the same as an actual gun? Id.
Heidi Beirich, White Homicide Worldwide, S. POVERTY L. CTR. (Apr. 1, 2014),
261
262
263

264

https://www.splcenter.org/20140331/white-homicide-worldwide [https://perma.cc/V6DY53XF]. Since the white supremacist website “Stormfront” went live in 1995, its registered
users have been disproportionately responsible for deadly hate crimes. Id.
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able to propound such ideas over the Internet in a
welcoming environment. 265
Since that speech, internet-related hate speech-turned-violent
dominates headlines. 266 In 2012, a white supremacist posted in online hate
groups right before he murdered six people at a Sikh temple in Wisconsin. 267
A man murdered nine people at a Black church in South Carolina in 2015
after being radicalized online. 268 In 2018, after being active on a white
supremacist social media site, a man murdered eleven people at a
Pennsylvania synagogue. 269
Perhaps courts are hesitant to regulate the internet, generally,
because it serves as a virtual town square, allowing a free exchange of (often
competing) ideas. 270 It has also been suggested that social media sites are
platforms, not publishers, open to both producers and consumers. 271 Also,
comparisons to authoritarian governments that heavily regulate the internet
are undesirable. 272
The A.J.B. court, nonetheless, agreed with Reno that First
Amendment protections are not relinquished just because speech or
expressive conduct occurs on the internet. 273 It quotes the Court, saying:
“There is ‘no basis for qualifying the level of First Amendment scrutiny that
should be applied’ to online speech.” 274 Assuming this reasoning is sound, it
should work both ways: if publishing a physical manual on how to commit
a specific crime is unprotected, criminally actionable speech, 275 so, too,
should that parity extend to analogous expression on the internet. While a
two-tiered system of First Amendment protections would, indeed, be
inadvisable, the totality of First Amendment freedoms and consequences
must be applied equally.
Internet Hate and the Law, INTELLIGENCE REPORT (Mar. 15, 2000),
https://www.splcenter.org/fighting-hate/intelligence-report/2000/internet-hate-and-law
[https://perma.cc/VGE3-BXRB] (highlights from spoken remarks).
Rachel Hatzipanagos, How Online Hate Turns into Real-Life Violence, WASH. POST
(Nov. 30, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2018/11/30/how-online-hatespeech-is-fueling-real-life-violence/ [https://perma.cc/U4PC-4RJZ].
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Jeff Jarvis, Platforms Are Not Publishers, THE ATLANTIC (Aug. 10, 2018),
https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2018/08/the-messy-democratizing-beauty-of-theinternet/567194/ [https://perma.cc/W7DP-P6VE].
Jyh-An Lee, Ching-Yi Liu & Weiping Li, Searching for Internet Freedom in China: A Case
Study on Google’s China Experience, 31 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 405, 406 (2013).
In re Welfare of A.J.B., 929 N.W.2d 840, 846 (Minn. 2019).
Id. (quoting Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 870 (1997)).
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Constitutionality vs. Compassion

Free speech is considered a core value in the United States, but it
is not the only core value. University of California professor Judith Butler
explained the cost of prioritizing ideas over humanity:
I suppose we are being asked to understand that we will,
in the name of freedom of speech, willingly allow our
environment to be suffused with hatred, threats, and
violence, that we will see the values we teach and to which
we adhere destroyed by our commitment to free speech .
. . . 276
Two prominent and unfortunate cases exemplify this concept.
First, in Virginia v. Black, the Court held that the First Amendment did not
permit the government to impose special prohibitions on speakers who
express views on disfavored subjects. 277 Cross-burning on the lawn of an
African American family, it stated, was intimidating but protected speech. 278
With a surprise dissent, however, Justice Thomas (stalwart defender of First
Amendment protections for most of his tenure on the Supreme Court)
expressed not only his displeasure with the opinion, but suggested that cross
burning was so damaging that the Court should expand its limited
exceptions to include the practice, 279 saying, “those who hate cannot terrorize
and intimidate to make their point.” 280
Then, in Snyder v. Phelps, the Court held that picketing a military
funeral is constitutional; no matter how offensive, outrageous, or upsetting,
free speech trumps emotional distress. 281 Similar to the Thomas dissent in
Black, Justice Alito was the surprise dissenter in Snyder, falling on the side
of compassion over freedom: “[o]ur profound national commitment to free

Conor Friedersdorf, Judith Butler Overestimates the Power of Hateful Speech, THE
ATLANTIC (Dec. 12, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/12/judithbutler-on-the-power-of-hateful-speech/548138/ [https://perma.cc/7RH2-NLWY]; see also
Marantz, supra note 244 (quoting Butler) (“We should perhaps frankly admit that we have
agreed in advance to have our community sundered, racial and sexual minorities demeaned,
the dignity of trans people denied, that we are, in effect, willing to be wrecked by this principle
of free speech.”).
Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 347–48 (2003).
Id. at 363 (O’Connor, J. writing for the majority: “[a State may prohibit] only those forms
of intimidation that are most likely to inspire fear of bodily harm.”).
Id. at 388 (Thomas, J. dissenting) (arguing that certain First Amendment exceptions should
be allowable).
Id. at 394.
Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 458 (2011) (“[I]n public debate [we] must tolerate
insulting, and even outrageous, speech in order to provide adequate ‘breathing space’ to the
freedoms protected by the First Amendment.”) (quoting Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 322
(1988)).
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and open debate is not a license for the vicious verbal assault that occurred
in this case.” 282
In 2019, ACLU’s John Powell highlighted the need to protect
speech, but not to the exclusion of morality: “Racists should have rights . . .
. I also know, being black and having black relatives, what it means to have
a cross burned on your lawn. It makes no sense for the law to be concerned
about one and ignore the other.” 283

C.

In the Absence of Government

In the gaps left by legislators and the courts, private actors have
stepped in, protecting human rights while their leaders are silent. After
Snyder, counterprotests shielded military funerals from the hate-filled sights
and sounds of the Westboro Baptist Church (“WBC”). In 2012, hundreds
of Texas A&M students gathered to create a human wall around the funeral
service for a soldier, blocking the WBC members from view. 284 Student
organizer Elyssa DeCaprio said, “[WBC’s] message is just one of pure hate,
and it’s not something we want people to listen to.” 285 Even the ACLU, which
has defended the WBC, 286 in 2018 changed its guidelines governing case
selection to take the content and effect of speech into consideration, and
not just the fact that it is speech, generally. 287
Recently, social media companies stepped in to regulate harmful
speech on the internet, countering Reno’s assertion that anything goes.
Facebook and Instagram banned the far-right collective called “the Proud

Id. at 463.
Marantz, supra note 245.
Katie Notopolous, Texas A&M Students Block Westboro Baptist Protesters with Human
Wall, BUZZFEED (Aug. 23, 2020), https://www.buzzfeed.com/katienotopoulos/texas-am282
283
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students-block-westboro-baptist-prot [https://perma.cc/3A7V-F8UA].
Dan Solomon, Texas A&M Students Shouted Down a Westboro Baptist Church
Demonstration With Yell Practice, TEX. MONTHLY (Nov. 12, 2014),
https://www.texasmonthly.com/the-daily-post/texas-am-students-shouted-down-a-westborobaptist-church-demonstration-with-yell-practice/ [https://perma.cc/AHK6-U2BJ].
See Chris Hampton, Why Fred Phelps’s Free Speech Rights Should Matter to Us All,
ACLU BLOG (Oct. 7, 2010), https://www.aclu.org/blog/free-speech/rights-protesters/whyfred-phelpss-free-speech-rights-should-matter-us-all [https://perma.cc/D7KS-53P9].
Wendy Kaminer, The ACLU Retreats from Free Expression, WALL ST. J. (June 20, 2018),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-aclu-retreats-from-free-expression-1529533065
[https://perma.cc/SCF3-G4E8] (“Speech that denigrates [marginalized] groups can inflict
serious harms and is intended to and often will impede progress toward equality.”).
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Boys,” 288 which was designated as a hate group by the SPLC. 289 Similar to the
in-person WBC counterprotests, social media users attempted to drown out
the online visibility of the hate group by posting images of LGBTQ love
with the hashtag “#ProudBoys,” 290 essentially enacting a virtual “heckler’s
veto.” 291 In 2020, YouTube announced it was updating its hate-speech and
harassment policies to prohibit “content that targets an individual or group
with conspiracy theories that have been used to justify real-world
violence.” 292 It is heartening to know that private actors will fill the gaps left
by the government when it comes to protecting their neighbors.

D. Overcorrection
It is arguable that private actions referenced above overstepped
when it comes to protecting the emotional lives of our neighbors. “Cancel
culture” refers to the recent phenomenon of fervent public criticism of a
person, business, movement, or idea. 293 There is often an element of
shaming or boycotting a business. 294 Adding irony to insult, there is now a
vicious cycle of canceling speech that cancels speech. 295 One wonders if
society is chasing its tail when it comes to freedom of speech.
Boycotting a product or company based on its ideas is a perfectly
legal means of persuasion (one might even say coercion). The same goes
for speaking out against celebrities who espouse unpopular or hurtful views.
When J.K. Rowling gave her opinion of transgendered women, there was
Dade Hayes, Proud Boys Banned from Facebook in Effort to Rein in Hate Groups,
DEADLINE (Oct. 31, 2018), https://deadline.com/2018/10/proud-boys-gavin-mcinnesbanned-facebook-effort-to-rein-in-hate-groups-1202492920/
[https://perma.cc/6YCGN466].
Proud Boys, S. POVERTY L. CTR., https://www.splcenter.org/fighting-hate/extremistfiles/group/proud-boys [https://perma.cc/5KYB-HSTA].
April Siese, Twitter Users Take Over Proud Boys Hashtag with Photos of LGBTQ Love,
CBS NEWS (Oct. 5, 2020), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/proud-boys-twitter-hashtagphotos-lgbtq-love/ [https://perma.cc/8FFS-F6TC].
The term “heckler’s veto” is used when a heckler shouts down or boos a speaker,
preventing the speaker from being heard. The heckler’s speech is constitutionally
unprotected. See generally Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131 (1966).
The YouTube Team, Managing Harmful Conspiracy Theories on YouTube, YOUTUBE
OFF. BLOG (Oct. 15, 2020), https://blog.youtube/news-and-events/harmful-conspiracytheories-youtube [https://perma.cc/89CY-N7LD].
Katie Camero, What is ‘Cancel Culture’? J.K. Rowling Controversy Leaves Writers,
Scholars
Debating,
MIAMI
HERALD
(July
8,
2020),
https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/national/article244082037.html
[https://perma.cc/4FPA-PDPR].
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an instant backlash. 296 Fans and co-workers felt that Rowling’s comments
were hurtful and, given her platform, she should refrain from any similar
statements. 297 Instead, Rowling and more than one-hundred-fifty other wellknown signatories published an open letter in Harper’s Magazine arguing
that the recent stifling of free speech is creating an “intolerant climate” within
society. 298 In other words, it was a backlash about the backlash. Put another
way, people told Rowling she should curtail her speech, to which Rowling,
et al., responded that their detractors should curtail their speech about
curtailing speech. 299 The circularity continued: three days later, a group of
more than 150 well-known signatories published an open letter against that
open letter. 300 They wrote that the Harper’s letter was written primarily by
representatives of non-marginalized groups who already have highly-visible
platforms, out of a fear of “being silenced, that so-called cancel culture is
out of control, [] fear for their jobs and free exchange of ideas, even as they
speak from one of the most prestigious magazines in the country.” 301 So,
Group D censors Group C for censoring Group B for censoring Group A.
Perhaps this is an illustration of the dreaded slippery slope. 302 Perhaps the
A.J.B. court prescribed the right dosage of “medicine,” avoiding an
overdose.

E.

In the Shadow of A.J.B.

In 2020, another challenge to an overbroad statute involving
threatening behavior reached the Minnesota Supreme Court. 303 The court
did not change its opinion, nor its priorities: “‘The right of free expression
is as important to many people in their personal and institutional
relationships as it is in the narrower “civil liberties” related to politics . . .
.’” 304 In State v. Peterson, the Minnesota Court of Appeals again ruled against
the Minnesota Legislature, finding a stalking-by-telephone statute
overbroad. 305 The court cited A.J.B. to justify its reasoning that, as in the
stalking-by-mail statute, this provision “‘can prohibit and chill protected
296
297
298

Id.
Id.
A Letter on Justice and Open Debate, HARPER’S MAG. (July 7, 2020), https://harpers.org/a-

letter-on-justice-and-open-debate/ [https://perma.cc/SL4Y-PCJB].
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See id.
A More Specific Letter on Justice and Open Debate, THE OBJECTIVE (July 10, 2020),

https://theobjective.substack.com/p/a-more-specific-letter-on-justice
[https://perma.cc/6M6M-WZ2C].
301
302
303
304
305

Id.
See Dershowitz, supra note 98 and accompanying text.
State v. Jorgenson, 946 N.W.2d 596 (Minn. 2020).

Id. at 605 (citing State v. Robertson, 649 P.2d 569, 589 (Or. 1982)).
State v. Peterson, 936 N.W.2d 912, 923 (Minn. Ct. App. 2019).
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expression’” and was thus overbroad, despite the Appellant’s repeated,
harassing behavior. 306
In direct juxtaposition to the A.J.B. court’s jurisprudence
regarding free speech versus suicide encouragement 307 is Commonwealth v.
Carter, wherein the Massachusetts Supreme Court upheld the involuntary
manslaughter conviction of a minor for the death of her friend after verbally
encouraging him to commit suicide. 308 The Carter decision can be viewed as
a curtailment of a constitutionally guaranteed freedom. However, it is
possible that, in doing so, it prevented future loss of innocent life. Both
Melchert-Dinkel and A.J.B., while differing on their interpretations of the
legality of coerced suicide, protected speech-as-conduct more absolutely
than Carter.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Mr. Powell has an answer—or, at least, an analogy—for the
challenging balance of breadth: he compared harmful speech to carbon
pollution. 309 It is, indeed, legal to drive a car, but doing so, unfettered, will
hasten climate catastrophe. However, the government can regulate
greenhouse emissions, private actors can commit to renewable energy
sources, and civic groups can promote public transportation alternatives. 310
If not, Powell warns, “[e]veryone should be allowed to drive a car and that’s
that. But doing so wouldn’t stop the waters from rising around us.” 311
As for A.J.B., the Minnesota Supreme Court understood that to
claim a statute is overbroad, a balance must be achieved between upholding
the constitutional right to free expression and the negative societal result if
no limits are in place. However, the court turned a blind eye to the Supreme
Court’s Chaplinsky ruling that highlighted the importance of limiting speech
“which by [its] very utterance inflict[s] injury.” 312 By ignoring cases like
Chaplinsky, the expulsion of the stalking-by-mail statute and the drastic
narrowing of the mail harassment statute were missed opportunities to add
an exception to First Amendment protections by rendering the hateful,
dangerous speech demonstrated in A.J.B. legally intolerable. While
professing to prioritize constitutional equilibrium, the scales tipped
appreciably away from personal security in favor of free speech.
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We end as we began, with Justice Holmes. In 1919, the venerable
jurist stated: “The question in every case is whether the words used are used
in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and
present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress
has a right to prevent.” 313 Nearly one-hundred years later, we are no closer
to an invariable answer to that question. 314 Clearly, the past remains
prologue, as the free speech argument continues to vacillate, upholding the
tension necessary to maintain its tenuous balance.

Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
Lind, supra note 76 (“[W]hether the best way to protect the powerless is to stand against
the principles that could be used to crush them.”).
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